Judging Trump’s Asia and Regional Reaction to DPRK

Trump has recently concluded his Asian diplomatic marathon–five countries in a week and a half. It was the longest tour of Asia by a sitting President since the end of the Cold War.

Of the trip, CNN said Trump found “success overseas“, while the Washington Post claims it “wasn’t the success” Trump thought it was. So was it a success? Well… that depends on what the major goals of the trip actually were.

Oftentimes, major diplomatic missions to regions of the globe, rather than specific nations, focus on multilateral trade. However, Trump left the TPP as one of his first acts of President, and has shown no signs of regret. If anything, the Donald Trump/Bernie Sanders isolationist opposition to free trade has been one of the few areas that Trump has remained consistent on. Multilateral trade in the region still progresses without the US, in the form of the CPTPP, which is essentially the TPP that leaves America behind.

No, this trip wasn’t primarily about trade, it was about North Korea. And even when it was about trade, it revolved around a response to Rocket Man from sanctions to missile defense deals.

Harry Kazianis, Director of Defense Studies at the Center for the National Interest, said from the start “This trip will focus 90% on North Korea, 10% on trade“. The Heritage Foundation agreed, saying “North Korea will be an overriding issue in all of President Trump’s stops“.

North Korea has always been a regional problem more than an American one, and America has no options to meaningfully address it that do not involve it’s neighbors. Preemptive war with North Korea risks war with major powers like Russia and China without their prior consent, and likely massive civilian casualties in South Korea and Japan even with it. Any sanctions with any hope of effectiveness require regional support, as does diplomacy. For years, North Korea has been protected from internal revolution by harsh and brutal despotism, and from outside intervention by major powers like the USSR to China, all while it threatens the security of South Korea, Japan, and to a lesser extent, us.

So with North Korea in mind, how has Trump’s trip and tenure affected DPRK and it’s neighbors?

China:

China has always been DPRK’s greatest protector, even prior to the dissolution of the USSR. Alternate history is always fun conjecture that can never account for every butterfly effect, but it seems likely that without China’s million man support, North and South Korea would have been unified in the early 1950s under a government more similar to Seoul than Pyongyang.

In more recent times, their permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the attached veto power has prevented any real pressure from being exerted. Primarily because of China and Russia, the only options many past Presidents pursued were carrots, rather than sticks. Given the level of trust agreements with the North demand, such carrots only encouraged, in the long run, exactly what they were meant to prevent.

For decades, China’s trade with North Korea has been tantamount to subsidization, and without Chinese support, Kim’s rule is untenable. Ninety percent of North Korea’s trade is with China, and it makes up the rest primarily in arms deals with other rogue nations and terrorist groups.

China’s self interest has a major stake in North Korean stability. They have a legitimate fear of a massive refugee crisis into their country if the Korean ceasefire ever ends, or if Kim’s regime were to crumble internally. On top of that, they may have reason to worry about the kind of beachfront into Asia that a unified Korea may present, were South Korea and Japan freed from the fear of the North.

However, during Trump’s Presidency, Beijing’s patience seems to have run out. They have signed on to tough sanctions, and they have followed through. They’ve publicly stated that if the North initiates war, they cannot depend on their protection.

Perhaps their newfound lean towards actual action is the result of North Korea’s increased provocations, and it’s realization that protecting Kim isn’t actually in it’s long term interests. However…

Trump supporters have plenty to point to if they want to paint China’s cooperation as Trump’s success. After complaining that China hadn’t done enough, Trump tweeted a hope that “Perhaps China will put a heavy move on North Korea and end this nonsense once and for all!” UN Ambassador Nikki Haley threatened “that Beijing risks trade with the U.S. if it continues to trade with North Korea in violation of sanctions“, shortly before they signed onto sanctions.

One day after Trump concluded his Asian tour, China sent their “most senior official“, Song Tao, to North Korea. Song is the head of China’s ruling Communist Party’s international department.

South Korea:

I feel bad for South Korea, I really do.

Don’t get me wrong–South Korea has plenty going for it, especially compared to North Korea. It’s grown leaps and bounds since the split between North and South, enjoying freedom, a robust economy, and what is likely a bright future, assuming that North Korea doesn’t reign missiles down on them. Trump’s remarks to their National Assembly during his Asian trip flush out some cherry-picked yet undeniably impressive stats. “Today, your economy is more than 350 times larger than what it was in 1960. Trade has increased 1,900 times. Life expectancy has risen from just 53 years to more than 82 years today.”

But when it comes to their national security concerns, they are in an impossible situation.

If tensions continue to escalate between the North and, well, most of the rest of the world until it becomes an actual hot war? Seoul is the likely first major target obliterated, regardless of what the South does or says. Estimates of casualties of any war with North Korea run upwards to a million deaths in just the first few hours of the campaign.

They are, by tradition and perceived necessity, completely dependent upon the US for their protection. We still have over thirty thousand troops on the peninsula, sixty years since a ceasefire was announced. Basically all military maneuvers are joint exercises with the US. Soldiers stare at one another across the DMZ, and any twitch could conceivably restart hostilities when the North has nuclear weapons.

South Korea’s national security interests, unlike most countries, do not drive it’s policy. It’s policy is driven by other powers who have regard for South Korea’s defense only as it relates to their own interests. Their “decisions” in this arena are often driven by more powerful nations, vying for control, stability, or international globalized concerns removed from direct impacts to the South than by South Korea itself.

Their current head of state is Moon Jae-in, who campaigned as a relative dove. He publicly called for peace talks and a peace treaty in exchange for denuclearization, and opposed deployment of additional missile defense technology from America.

However, recent realities seem to have interceded. After a series of North Korean missile tests that have been seen as increased aggression, he pursued increasing missile defense by deploying the THAAD system he was opposed to as a candidate. Not only that, but to underscore the reality of countries like Israel and South Korea that have become dependent on us for their security at a detriment to their sovereignty, he… asked us permission to allow them to first.

In September, we began installing the THAAD system in South Korea. Their defense ministry said it was necessary because of “North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile threats.” It seems likely that the only way to give Trump credit for THAAD there, is to admit that under him, North Korea has gotten progressively more provocative and dangerous.

Which brings us to…

North Korea itself:

All year, it seems, North Korea has been engaging in nuclear tests, ballistic missile tests, including shooting several over Japan. In March, they warned that US-South Korean drills would lead to “nuclear disaster“. In April, they made a video simulating nuclear war on America and warned that “thermonuclear war may break out at any minute.” In July, they conducted a series of ICBM tests. In August, they claimed to have completed work on a nuclear warhead ICBM able to “easily reach the United States“, as well as threatening to incinerate Guam. In October, they tested a hydrogen bomb. In September, they seem to have conducted their sixth nuclear test.

Most provocatively, they shot a missile over the island of Japan–twice, violating their airspace and sovereignty. Japan didn’t shoot either down, but maybe third time’s the charm.

And, of course… there is an ongoing battle of words between Trump and Kim, escalating tensions with the feel of a middle school feud if middle-schoolers controlled nuclear weapons. They seem to constantly be questioning the size of each other’s… hands.

The most recent smack-talk was Trump tweeting “Why would Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me ‘old,’ when I would NEVER call him ‘short and fat?’ Oh well, I try so hard to be his friend – and maybe someday that will happen!” Kim responded through North Korean state media, saying Trump was a hideous criminal “sentenced to death” for the insult, adding that “He will be forced to pay dearly for his blasphemy any moment,”.

All of this is worth taking the time to smile over, because the alternative is to be terrified by the prospect of nuclear war initiated via twitter.

Obviously Trump did not meet with Kim during his Asian tour.

Japan:

As discussed above, North Korea flew missiles over Japan this year, and they have plenty of reason to be concerned themselves. Shinzo Abe has long wanted to expand his country’s own missile defense program, and Kim’s overshoot may have given him the internal support he needed to seal the deal.

During the Asian trip, Trump had a chance to talk about Japan’s potential purchase of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system from us. This initial meeting allowed Trump to present details about pricing and technical details, the first step in a process that often takes years and will need to involve Congressional review. But Shinzo has already indicated that he would like such a system, meaning that Trump’s entire goal was to not muck it up.

During a joint press conference in Japan and while standing next to their prime minister, Trump said “One of the things I think is very important is the prime minister is going to be purchasing massive amounts of military equipment, as he should,” following “It’s a lot of jobs for us and a lot of safety for Japan.” Shinzo didn’t contradict the finality of that, and if it all goes according to plan, the Aegis system would go into operation in 2023.

Even more importantly, in May Shinzo Abe set a deadline of 2020 for revising Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Essentially, Article 9 was inserted into their Constitution at the end of World War 2 in order to prevent Japan from maintaining a standing army as a means of deterring them from returning to aggression. In exchange, the US has taken on the responsibility for their defense. Changes that Shinzo Abe would like to see would allow the Japanese Self Defense Force to participate in more than peacekeeping missions

Russia:

Plenty has been written all year about the nexus between Trump and Putin. Is Putin playing Trump? If he is, is it based on Trump’s complicit cooperation with the Kremlin, or is Putin merely playing to his insecurity and narcissism?

The big news of their meeting in Vietnam focused on Trump saying he “believed Putin” about his denials of election meddling, in contrast to the assessment of the CIA. However, there are more than enough articles and speculation about Trump/Putin swirling around the internet, and our focus here is on Russia on North Korea.

Like China, Russia uncharacteristically voted for this year’s hard sanctions on North Korea. Unlike China, it appears that Russia isn’t actually enforcing the sanctions in practice, especially with fuel imports.

As has been covered elsewhere:

China has been following through on sanctions, while “Russian nationals” have become smugglers, skirting sanctions through front companies. Whether or not these “nationals” are in the same category of “nationals” that perform hacks indirectly and with deniability for the Russian government is unclear. What is clear, is that certain front companies (like Velmur in Singapore) have set up a trail of paperwork allowing shipments barred by sanction agreements from Russia to North Korea.

As the Chinese oil companies have been forced to stand down, Russian smugglers have been standing up to fill the vacuum. Whether such shipments were orchestrated by the Russian government or merely tolerated, the fact remains that constant shipments between the Russian city of Vladivostok and North Korean ports has remained uninterrupted despite obvious Russian government knowledge.

Like so much with Russia, and foreign policy in general, it’s all about the oil. As Garry Kasparov famously said in his anti-Putin memoir ‘Winter is Coming’, “Experience has shown that you can often do just fine being on the wrong side of history if you are on the right side of the pipeline”, and the world runs on oil. Certainly, it’s one of the greatest needs of North Korean leadership.

All four of North Korea’s neighbors have made significant efforts to place pressure on the North since the beginning of Trump’s Presidency. China and Russia have agreed to sanctions they’ve traditionally vetoed, and China has actually followed through with the responsibilities of enforcement. Japan and South Korea are making strides towards missile defense in order to protect themselves, and by extension our interests. Japan has even expressed a willingness to amend their constitution in pursuit of their interests.

Grading Trump on this front is still difficult, despite any progress made regionally. Are these changes a result of any concrete positive action by Trump? Or is it a response instead to increasingly hostile North Korean rhetoric, threats, and actions, which may have been made worse by Trump’s rhetoric and threats? After all, regional action may be overdue, but may only have come because the situation simply got too out of control to ignore. Is it merely an inevitable and rational response to a long-time regional threat that these nations would have undertaken under President Hillary as well, or do we have Trump to thank or blame?

I don’t know how history will judge his actions here, but I do know it’ll depend more on what happens next than what could. He seems to be playing a dangerous game of chicken, and whether or not that was the right call could be based on nothing other than who blinks first, whether it was worth the risk or not… and whatever happens will seem inevitable in hindsight.